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COMMENTS
RUNNING OUT OF BOUNDS: OVER-
EXTENDING THE LABOR ANTITRUST
EXEMPTION IN CLARETT V. NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE
MICHAEL SCHEINKMANt
INTRODUCTION
The application of federal antitrust laws to agreements
between employers and unions has been an area of seemingly
endless tension, since the product of collective bargaining will
invariably minimize competition.1 With the development and
rapid growth of labor unions in the early twentieth century,
Congress and the courts soon noticed the inherent contradiction
between the goals of labor law, which sought to encourage
collective bargaining and employer-union negotiations, and those
of antitrust law, which attempted to foster free competition. 2 The
t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2001,
Columbia University.
1 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996) ("As a matter of logic,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups of employers and employees
to bargain together, but at the same time to forbid them to make among
themselves... any... competition-restricting agreements .. "); Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)
(observing that application of antitrust laws would thwart the goals of federal labor
laws); Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that
the interaction of antitrust laws and labor laws has long been controversial).
2 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622; Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 700-03 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(mentioning the Sherman Act's ambiguous effect on labor unions); Jonathan S.
Shapiro, Warming the Bench: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in the National
Football League, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1206 (1993) (noting that antitrust laws
"would otherwise restrict, as a restraint of trade, the concerted activities that union
members regularly practice during collective bargaining with employers"); Shawn
Treadwell, Note, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption from the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
plain language of the Sherman Act 3 was so broad that remedial
action was necessary to shield labor activities from antitrust
scrutiny.4 Through several pieces of legislation, Congress formed
the statutory antitrust exemption, ensuring that labor unions
would not be considered conspiracies in restraint of trade, and
further exempting activities such as boycotts and secondary
picketing from antitrust laws.5 However, because these laws did
not protect employer-union agreements from antitrust scrutiny,
the Supreme Court chiseled a distinct and limited nonstatutory
exemption, noting that "labor policy requires tolerance for the
lessening of business competition based on differences in wages
and working conditions."6 Yet, some federal courts have been
more tolerant than others, leaving the reach of the exemption
unclear.7 Recently, in Clarett v. National Football League,8 the
Second Circuit greatly expanded the nonstatutory exemption,
protecting a National Football League ("NFL") eligibility rule
requiring that rookies be three seasons removed from their high
Antitrust Laws, in the Context of Professional Sports, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955,
957-58 (1996) (discussing "union concerns" that Sherman Act would subject labor to
antitrust scrutiny).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (declaring illegal "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce").
4 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325
U.S. 797, 801 (1945) ("Sharp controversy soon arose as to whether the [Sherman] Act
applied to unions."); Treadwell, supra note 2, at 957 (observing that "the vague
command of the Sherman Act ... left courts with great latitude in interpreting" the
law).
5 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (declaring that "[t]he labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce" and that labor organizations are
not to be "construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws"); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (2000)(shielding specified activities from antitrust laws); see also Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-
22; Shapiro, supra note 2, at 1205-06 (observing that the Clayton Act and Norris-
LaGuardia Act "statutorily exempt" labor activity from antitrust laws).
6 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622; see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 235-37 (holding that the
nonstatutory exemption "recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws.., some
restraints on competition imposed through the bargaining process must be shielded
from antitrust sanctions"); Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon,
Professional Football's Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust
Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 383-87 (1984) (referring to the nonstatutory exemption as
an accommodation between labor law and antitrust law); Shapiro, supra note 2, at
1208 (describing how "[t]he exemption grants preeminence to labor laws,
and ... collective bargaining, over antitrust laws" under certain circumstances).
7 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The
Supreme Court has never delineated the precise boundaries of the exemption ... 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
8 Id.
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school graduation, even though this provision was only
incorporated by reference in the collective bargaining agreement
between the NFL and the NFL Players' Association ("NFLPA"). 9
Maurice Clarett, the plaintiff challenging the NFL's
eligibility rule, was a star running back for Ohio State University
and former Big Ten Freshman of the Year. 10 As the first Ohio
State freshman in sixty years to open a season starting at
running back, Clarett led the Buckeyes to an undefeated national
championship season, scoring the winning touchdown in the 2003
Fiesta Bowl. 1' After being suspended from college football at the
start of his sophomore year, Clarett sought entry into the 2004
NFL Draft but was denied because he graduated high school in
December 2001, too late to satisfy the three-year eligibility rule.
12
While football pundits disagreed over Clarett's potential as a
professional running back and his likely draft position, there was
little doubt that he would be drafted at some point during the
2004 NFL Draft. 13
The NFL, an unincorporated association of thirty-two
member teams, began operations as the American Professional
Football Association in 1920.14 Currently, it is not only North
America's most financially successful professional football league,
9 See id. at 126-27, 142-43. It should also be noted that, unlike professional
baseball, professional football enjoys no league-specific antitrust exemption. See
Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1957). Despite the
subsequent creation of both the statutory and nonstatutory exemptions, Major
League Baseball continues to enjoy its unique antitrust exemption granted in
Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922). Although
called "more a panegyric to the virtues of baseball and its important role in
American culture than an informed commentary on antitrust law," the Federal
Baseball antitrust exemption has continued to persist despite Major League
Baseball's growth and labor strife. See CHARLES P. KORR, THE END OF BASEBALL As
WE KNEW IT 4 (2002); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-85 (1972)
(expressing reluctance to overturn the policy after fifty years); Toolson v. N.Y.
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (deferring to Congress as the proper source
for any change in Baseball's antitrust status).
10 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125-26.
11 See id. at 126; see also Josh Dubow, Clarett Steps Up When Buckeyes Need
Him Most, Jan. 3, 2003, available at http://ohiostatebuckeyes.collegesports.com/
sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/010303aad.html.
12 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126.
13 See Bob Glauber, Clarett Sues NFL for Right to Enter Draft, NEWSDAY, Sept.
24, 2003, at A60 (describing several NFL executives as saying that Clarett would
'likely... be a first-round choice").
14 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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but also its most successful professional league in any sport. 15
Accordingly, NFL players are extraordinarily well-compensated.
In 2003, the average player earned $1,258,800, and the average
first round draft pick earned $1,367,120.16 The NFL, through its
representative, the NFL Management Council ("NFLMC"), and
the NFLPA entered into their first collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA") in 1968 and executed the CBA in effect
during the Clarett litigation in 1993.17 The CBA, together with
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, outline the relationship
between the league and its players.' 8 Among the key provisions
of the CBA is a salary cap used by the league to assign a fixed
limit on the amount of money each team can pay to its players. 19
Also "capped" is the amount each team can pay its rookies and
incoming players, one of which Clarett sought to be.20
The eligibility rule challenged by Clarett had been in
existence in some form since 1925, when the NFL required all
players to be at least four years removed from their high school
graduations.21 The eligibility rule in effect at the time of the
1993 CBA appeared in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws and
required that players seeking to be drafted complete all four
years of their college eligibility. 22 However, a "Special Eligibility"
provision was available to players seeking entry into the draft
who were only three NFL seasons removed from their high school
15 Id. at 383. The NFL has been estimated to have a league-wide value of nearly
$18 billion, while the next most valuable league, the National Basketball
Association, is valued at less than $9 billion. Id. at 383 n.6.
16 Id. at 383. At the start of the 2004 season, the average salary of a 2004 first
round draft pick, which Clarett aspired to be, had increased to $1,396,200. M.J.
DUBERSTEIN, OMNIBUS: FINAL 2004 OFF-SEASON SALARY AVERAGES & SIGNING
TRENDS 282 (2004), available at http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/shared/20o4_season_
final-pre-season_ salary_&_salary-trends-omnibus-september_2004.pdf
17 Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
18 Id. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION 2002-2008 (2002)
[hereinafter CBA], available at http://www.nflpa.org[Media/main.asp?subPage=
CBA+Complete (containing the complete CBA) (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
19 See generally CBA, supra note 18, art. XXIV (laying out detailed criteria for
determining the league-wide salary, salary cap, and minimum team salary).
20 See generally id. art. XVII (providing salary limits for the NFL's "Entering
Player Pool").
21 Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385. The rule originated in the aftermath of
University of Illinois superstar Red Grange's controversial decision to leave college
to pursue a professional career in 1925. Id.
22 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (referencing
NFL Constitution and Bylaws, art. XII), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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graduations. 23  These players were required to submit
applications to the Commissioner of the NFL, who routinely
granted them.24 These eligibility rules were not specifically
included in the 1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement, only
finding their way into the CBA through a merger clause:
This Agreement represents the complete understanding of the
parties on all subjects covered herein, and there will be no
change in the terms and conditions of this Agreement without
mutual consent .... [T]he NFLPA and the Management
Council waive all rights to bargain with one another concerning
any subject covered or not covered in this Agreement for the
duration of this Agreement, including the provisions of the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws; provided, however, that if any
proposed change in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws during
the term of this Agreement could significantly affect the terms
and conditions of employment of NFL players, then the
Management Council will give the NFLPA notice of and
negotiate the proposed change in good faith.
25
In addition to this reference within the Agreement, the NFLMC
and NFLPA executed a side letter acknowledging that the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws were so referenced. 26 However, the only
evidence presented that the eligibility rule in particular was ever
the subject of collective bargaining during the 1993 negotiations
was the testimony of NFL negotiator Peter Ruocco, who could not
say how much time was spent on the provision or whether the
NFLPA received anything in return.2
7
Since the eligibility rule clearly precluded him from entering
the draft, Clarett sued the NFL,28 arguing that the rule was an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust
laws. 29  The United States District Court for the Southern
23 Id.
24 See id. In fact, the NFL granted "Special Eligibility" in the 2004 NFL Draft to
forty-one underclassmen who applied and met the league's "three-year eligibility
rule." Press Release, Nat'l Football League, NFL Declares Special Draft Eligibility
for 41 Players (Jan. 19, 2004), available at http://www.detroitlions.coml
document-display.cfm?documentid=313922.
25 CBA, supra note 18, art. III, § 1.
26 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128.
27 Id. Ruocco attested merely that the "eligibility rule itself was the subject of
collective bargaining." Id.
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (granting a cause of action to "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws").
29 See supra note 3.
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District of New York ruled for Clarett, finding that the
nonstatutory exemption did not extend so far as to protect a
provision that did not cover a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, that applied to parties outside of the bargaining unit,
and that did not arise from bona fide arm's-length negotiations. 30
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, holding only that the eligibility rule was
shielded from antitrust scrutiny by the nonstatutory exemption. 31
In reaching this conclusion, the court disagreed with the rule of
law applied by the district court. The court noted that the
district court's basis for ruling for Clarett was the application of
the three-part test derived from the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v.
National Football League.32  The Second Circuit had never
adopted the test from Mackey, and in fact had consistently
declined to apply it. 33
30 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392-97 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (discussing the scope of the nonstatutory exemption and ultimately
determining that the eligibility rule is not within the scope of the exemption), rev'd,
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005). District Judge
Scheindlin adopted these three factors from the Eighth Circuit's decision in Mackey
v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976). While Judge
Scheindlin recognized that the Second Circuit had explicitly rejected the Mackey test
in favor of a test "that balances the conflicting policies embodied in the labor and
antitrust laws, with the policies inherent in labor law serving as the first point of
reference," she applied the three Mackey factors anyway, citing Mackey throughout
her discussion. See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 390-97 ("In a more recent case, the
Second Circuit acknowledged the test promulgated by the Eighth Circuit, but
preferred to apply the simple formulation enunciated by the Supreme Court."). The
district court held that the eligibility rule was not a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining because it was related to job eligibility, and not "wages, hours, or
conditions." Id. at 395. Further, the rule applied to those excluded from the
bargaining unit because Clarett was not a traditional newcomer to an industry.
Rather, he was "categorically denied eligibility for employment." Id. at 395-96.
Lastly, the court held that the rule did not arise from bona fide arm's-length
bargaining because instead of proving that it did, the NFL relied upon the waiver of
the right to bargain over provisions in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. Id. at 396-
97. After holding that the eligibility rule was not subject to the nonstatutory
exemption, the court held that Clarett had the required antitrust standing, and that
the rule was an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 382.
31 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125 n.1 ("Because we find that the eligibility rules are
immune.., under the non-statutory labor exemption, we do not express an opinion
on ... Clarett['s] ... antitrust injury ... or that the eligibility rules constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade ... ").
32 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
33 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133 ("We... have never regarded the Eighth
Circuit's test in Mackey as defining the appropriate limits of the non-statutory
exemption."); see also Local 210, Laborers' Int'l Union v. Labor Relations Div.
Associated Gen. Contractors, 844 F.2d 69, 80 n.2 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[W]e need not
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Having rejected Mackey as not binding, the court relied on
several of its prior decisions relating to labor disputes in
professional sports as precedent for giving great deference to
professional sports leagues. It noted that it "need only retrace
the path laid down by these prior cases to reach the conclusion
that Clarett's antitrust claims must fail. '34 After analyzing its
holdings in Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n,35 National
Basketball Ass'n v. Williams,36 and Wood v. National Basketball
Ass'n,37 as well the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.,38 the court held that controlling case law bound it
to rule for the NFL because subjecting any provision of a
collective bargaining agreement to antitrust scrutiny would
seriously threaten the very foundation supporting the collective
bargaining process.39
While applying this rule to the facts presented by Clarett
and the NFL, the court focused its analysis on the same three
factors of the Mackey test that it had earlier rejected. Without
mentioning Mackey specifically, the court held that "eligibility
rules are mandatory bargaining subjects," because in the NFL's
unique salary system, every player has a significant effect on
every other player's employment status and salary.40 Further,
adopt [Mackey].").
34 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135.
35 66 F.3d 523, 529 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that "circumstances under which an
employer may discharge.. . an employee" are protected under the nonstatutory
exemption).
36 45 F.3d 684, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the nonstatutory exemption to
NBA salary cap and draft process although they were agreed to in a collective
bargaining agreement that had expired).
37 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the nonstatutory exemption
protected the NBA salary cap and draft from the antitrust laws).
38 518 U.S. 231, 234 (1996) (applying the nonstatutory exemption to an
employer's unilateral imposition of terms after the parties had reached impasse).
39 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135-38.
Our analysis in each case was rooted in the observation that the
relationships among the ... sports leagues and their players were governed
by collective bargaining agreements and thus were subject to the carefully
structured regime established by federal labor laws. We reasoned that to
permit antitrust suits against sports leagues on the ground that their
concerted action imposed a restraint upon the labor market would seriously
undermine many of the policies embodied by these labor laws.
Id. at 135.
40 See id. at 139-40. The court initially analogized the league's refusal to make
players such as Clarett eligible to the NBA's refusal to hire a discharged player in
Caldwell, saying that if the latter constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
former must as well. See id.; see also Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529. The court then turned
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the court held that the NFLPA sufficiently represented Clarett's
interests as a prospective employee so as to consider him a part
of the bargaining unit.41 Lastly, the court concluded that the
waiver in the CBA of the right to bargain over the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws was enough to satisfy the requirement
of good faith bargaining. 42 As a result, the court reversed the
judgment of the district court and vacated its order designating
Clarett eligible to enter the 2004 NFL Draft.43 After Clarett's
unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court, 44 the 2004 NFL Draft
took place without him on April 24-25. 45
This Comment disagrees with the Clarett court's decision to
extend the nonstatutory exemption to the NFL eligibility rule. It
argues that the Second Circuit misinterpreted distinguishable
precedent as binding. Additionally, the court erred in both steps
of its analysis-first by rejecting the test from Mackey while
nevertheless applying its three factors, and then in misapplying
those three factors to the facts presented.
Part I of this Comment outlines the origins of the
nonstatutory exemption and the theory underlying it. Part II
asserts that the Second Circuit erred in treating its factually
distinguishable prior cases as binding on its decision in Clarett.
Part III maintains that the court's stated rejection of the Eighth
Circuit's test from Mackey was meaningless, since the test it
to the "unusual economic imperatives of professional sports," highlighting its unique
mix of capped salaries, fixed rosters, entry drafts and free agency. Clarett, 369 F.3d
at 140. As a part of this intricate system, the elimination of the eligibility rules
would undermine the basis for the collective bargaining agreement, making the
eligibility rule so closely connected to wages and working conditions as to make it a
mandatory subject of bargaining. See id.
41 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140-41 (stating that a union in a collective
bargaining relationship is empowered to advantage certain groups of employees over
others, which may include setting rules for employee eligibility).
42 See id. at 142-43 (holding that the waiver of any challenge to the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws in the CBA "makes clear that the union and the NFL
reached an agreement with respect to how the eligibility rules would be handled").
43 Id. at 143.
44 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, No. 03A870, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3231, at *1
(Apr. 22, 2004). Almost one year later, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari
on the merits. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005). Also in April
2005, the officially draft-eligible Clarett was selected surprisingly high in the third
round of the 2005 NFL draft by the Denver Broncos, who subsequently released him
before the 2005 NFL season began. Joe Drape, Gamble on Clarett Reveals Perils of
Potential, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at D8.
45 See NFL.com, 2004 NFL Draft, http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/years/2004
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
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applied in Clarett was virtually indistinguishable. Lastly, Part
IV asserts that the court erred in its application of the three
factors from Mackey.
I. ORIGINS OF THE EXEMPTION
Labor exemption from antitrust law stems from both
congressional and judicial recognition of the need to ensure that
organized labor is able to operate effectively without fear of
antitrust liability. 46 As has been widely noted by both courts and
commentators, many of the traditional actions of labor unions
have anticompetitive effects.47 Congress acted first in passing
legislation that forms the basis for the statutory exemption,
which insulates pickets, boycotts, and other activities that labor
unions conduct on their own. 48 The statutory exemption did not,
however, exempt "concerted action or agreements between
unions and nonlabor parties."49 Regarding this area of potential
union liability as contrary to the intent of Congress and as a
gaping hole in the concentric circles of labor and antitrust law,
the Supreme Court sought to extend the exemption, and thereby
extend the protections afforded to unions.50 Accordingly, the
46 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-37 (1996) (stating that
labor organizations would be rendered powerless by imposing antitrust liability
upon collective bargaining); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) ("Union success in organizing workers and
standardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but
the goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on business
competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws."); Local Union No. 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 711 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the regulatory labor relations scheme enacted by Congress
"would be virtually destroyed by the imposition of Sherman Act criminal and civil
penalties upon employers and unions engaged in ... collective bargaining").
47 See, e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. at 237; McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 6, at
385 ("Agreements between employers and unions.., are frequently 'combinations in
restraint of trade' within the literal language of the Sherman Act.").
48 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) ("Nothing contained in' the antitrust
laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of
labor.., organizations .. "); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113
(2000) (insulating various labor dispute activities from antitrust liability); United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941) ("[W]hether trade union conduct
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the
Sherman Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a
harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct."); supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
49 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23; see also Brown, 518 U.S. at 253-54 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
50 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (explaining that the nonstatutory exemption is
2005]
ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW
nonstatutory exemption, which "has its source in the strong labor
policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate
competition over wages and working conditions,"51 serves to
insulate some union-employer agreements from antitrust
scrutiny even though they restrain competition. 52 Over a period
of thirty years, the Supreme Court decided four relevant cases in
which the Court attempted to define some of the boundaries and
limits of the still amorphous antitrust exemption. 53
In the first case to focus on the exemption, Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers,54 the Supreme Court refused to apply the exemption
where a union negotiated a series of "closed-shop" agreements. 55
The electrical workers' union obtained agreements from
contractors and manufacturers to deal only with other
contractors and manufacturers that employed its members. 56
After obtaining this monopoly, members saw their wages
increase, their hours decline, and their opportunities for
employment expand. 57 When determining the parties' antitrust
liability, the Court recognized the difficulty in choosing between
federal antitrust laws and federal labor laws.5 8  The Court
declined to apply the exemption, holding that by conspiring with
non-labor groups, the union lost the immunity that would have
protected it had it acted to achieve this success on its own.5 9
necessary to give federal labor laws their intended effect); Connell, 421 U.S. at 622
("The Court has recognized, however, that a proper accommodation between the
congressional policy favoring collective bargaining.., and the congressional policy
favoring free competition ... requires that some union-employer agreements be
accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.").
51 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
52 See id.
53 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The
Supreme Court has never delineated the precise boundaries of the exemption .... ),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005); McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 6, at 386
(stating that "the specific contours of the labor exemption remain uncertain").
54 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
55 See id. at 799, 809-10.
56 See id. at 799.
57 See id. at 800.
58 See id. at 806 ("[W]e have two declared congressional policies which it is our
responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business
economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions
through the agency of collective bargaining.").
59 See id. at 809 ("So far as the union might have achieved this result acting
alone, it would have been the natural consequence of labor union activities
exempted .... But when the unions participated with a combination of business
[Vol. 79:733
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Moreover, the Court framed the initial scope of the nonstatutory
exemption as one limited to activity conducted by the union
itself, indicating that the legality of union activity depended on
"whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups."60
Two decades later, the Supreme Court again dealt with the
nonstatutory exemption, deciding two landmark cases on the
same day-declining to apply the exemption in United Mine
Workers v. Pennington,61 and applying the exemption in Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. 62 In
Pennington, a mine workers' union agreed with larger coal mines
to demand higher wages from smaller coal mines. 63 The Court
injected a new factor into its analysis, identifying wages as a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the National
Labor Relations Act.64 However, the Court declined to issue a
blanket exemption for all agreements resulting from negotiations
over mandatory bargaining subjects. 65 Instead, the Court noted
that whether antitrust liability will attach to such agreements
depends on the "form and content of the agreement."66
Accordingly, the exemption normally enjoyed by the union is
forfeited when it agrees with one set of employers to seek certain
standards "outside the bargaining unit."67
In contrast, in Jewel Tea, a meatpackers' union and several
meat dealers agreed to shorten the length of the employees'
workdays, fearing the threat posed by nighttime sales of pre-
packaged meat by unskilled laborers. 68 The Court applied the
men... a situation was created not included within the exemptions ....").
60 See id. at 810; Milton Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1287, 1341 (1982) ("In Allen Bradley, the Court clarified the limits of the
evolving labor exemption, explaining that the exemption does not shelter a union
that participates in a conspiracy among employers to fix prices or to monopolize a
market.").
61 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965).
62 381 U.S. 676, 688 (1965).
63 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 660.
64 See id. at 665-66. The National Labor Relations Act defines collective
bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .... 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
65 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 668.
68 See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
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nonstatutory exemption, though the justices disagreed as to the
scope of the exemption. 69 Justice White, writing for three justices
in the opinion designated as that of the Court, again focused on
the fact that hours are mandatory subjects of bargaining, stating
that "this fact weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for
agreements on these subjects." 70 However, it was not conclusive,
and the Court's analysis considered other factors. In a passage
that the Second Circuit would later adopt as its own standard for
the exemption, 71 the Court held:
[T]he issue in this case is whether the marketing-hours
restriction, like wages, and unlike prices, is so intimately
related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions'
successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide,
arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union
policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with
nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor
policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. 72
Concluding that the agreement covered a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, and that the union earned it through
negotiations with multiple employers, the Court exempted the
provision from antitrust scrutiny.73
Justice Goldberg also wrote an opinion on behalf of three
justices, dissenting in Pennington and concurring in Jewel Tea,
arguing that such a balancing test was unnecessary because all
U.S. 676, 680-81 (1965).
69 See id. at 679, 688. Justice White wrote the Court's opinion on behalf of
himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Brennan. Id. at 679. Justice Goldberg
authored a concurrence on behalf of himself and Justices Harlan and Stewart. Id. at
697 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Douglas penned a dissent joined by Justices
Black and Clark. Id. at 735 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 689.
71 See Berman Enter. v. Local 333, United Marine Div., 644 F.2d 930, 935 n.8
(2d Cir. 1981) (referring to the passage as "a classic formulation of the standard for
determining applicability of the labor exemption"); see also Home Box Office, Inc. v.
Directors Guild, 531 F. Supp. 578, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1983).
72 Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90.
73
Weighing the respective interests involved, we think the national labor
policy.., places beyond the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer
agreements on when, as well as how long, employees must work. An
agreement on these subjects between the union and the employers in a
bargaining unit is not illegal ... nor is the union's unilateral demand for
the same contract of other employers ....
Id. at 691.
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agreements covering mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
should be entitled to the nonstatutory exemption.7 4 Expanding
the exemption in this fashion, he argued, was the only way to
"effectuate [the] congressional intent" of obligating parties to
bargain over the specified mandatory subjects. 75
In 1975, the Supreme Court spoke again on the scope of the
nonstatutory exemption, declining to apply it in Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100.76 In Connell, a plumbers' union obtained, through picketing,
an agreement with a contractor to subcontract only to firms that
employed union members. 77 The Court noted that the union-
contractor agreement was not a collective bargaining
agreement.78 The Court also distinguished between agreements
that follow from negotiations over mandatory bargaining subjects
and those that do not, holding that the anticompetitive effects of
the union's control over subcontract work were "unrelated to the
union's legitimate goals of organizing workers and standardizing
working conditions."79
Though these four cases do not set firm boundaries for the
application of the nonstatutory exemption, they do establish
several basic principles. In Jewel Tea, the Court clearly
distinguished between mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining by deferring to the union where the
anticompetitive effects of the agreement were related to the
length of the working day, a mandatory bargaining subject.80
74 See id. at 710 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
75 Id. (asserting that "in order to effectuate congressional intent, collective
bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Labor
Act is not subject to the antitrust laws").
76 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
77 See id. at 618-19.
78 See id. at 619-20 (observing that, as expressed in the agreement, Local 100
did not wish to act as a collective bargaining representative for Connell's employees).
79 See id. at 624. The Court also noted that this restraint on business does "not
follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working
conditions," and, accordingly, "federal policy favoring collective bargaining.., can
offer no shelter for the union's ... action against Connell or its campaign to exclude
nonunion firms from the subcontracting market." Id. at 625-26.
80 Compare Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691 ('We think that the [hours provision is]
well within the realm of 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment' about which employers and unions must bargain."), with Connell, 421
U.S. at 625 ("This kind of direct restraint on the business market has substantial
anticompetitive effects ... that would not follow naturally from the elimination of
competition over wages and working conditions.").
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The Court also looked to the effects of the agreement, refusing to
apply the exemption where parties excluded from bargaining
were significantly affected.81  Lastly, by mentioning "bona fide,
arm's-length bargaining,"8 2 the Court appeared to put into words
what may have been obvious-that collective bargaining
agreements will be exempted from liability only when they are
truly the products of collective bargaining. 83
II. SECOND GUESSING THE SECOND CIRCUIT
After reviewing the historical background for the
nonstatutory exemption established by the Supreme Court,8 4 the
Clarett court distinguished between the facts presented in those
four cases and those presented by Clarett, noting that the former
were cases initiated by businesses suing their competitors for
restraining the product market, while the latter featured a
prospective employee complaining of a restraint on the labor
market.8 5 In this scenario, the Second Circuit held that its
decisions in Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n,8 6 National
Basketball Ass'n v. Williams,8 7 and Wood v. National Basketball
Ass'n,88 as well as the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.,89 precluded it from ruling for Clarett. 90
This Comment maintains that in reaching this conclusion,
the Second Circuit significantly misinterpreted key aspects of
these decisions and overlooked critical factual differences in
concluding that Clarett's complaint was indistinguishable from
those of the unsuccessful plaintiffs in Caldwell, Williams, Wood,
and Brown.
81 See Connell, 421 U.S. at 626 (observing that the union sought to exclude
nonunion parties from the market); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 665 (1965) (holding that "a union forfeits its exemption... when it is clearly
shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on
other bargaining units").
82 Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690.
83 See id. at 689-90; Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th
Cir. 1976).
84 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 130-33 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
85 Id. at 134.
86 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
87 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
88 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
89 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
90 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135 ("We need only retrace the path laid down by these
prior cases to reach the conclusion that Clarett's antitrust claims must fail.").
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In Wood, a first round NBA draft selection sued the NBA,
alleging that the NBA's draft and team salary cap provisions
contained in the NBA's collective bargaining agreement were
illegal.91 The court applied the nonstatutory exemption, holding
that to allow Wood to undo important provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement would "subvert fundamental principles of
our federal labor policy. '92 Moreover, the court held that both the
draft and salary cap were mandatory subjects of bargaining, 93
that they were the results of actual collective bargaining, and,
therefore, that striking down either provision would untangle the
"unique bundle of compromises" that comprised the agreement. 94
In holding that its decision in Wood was controlling over the
case presented by Clarett, the Second Circuit ignored several
significant factual distinctions. Wood was actually drafted in the
1984 NBA Draft and then sued the league, arguing that the very
agreement that allowed him to enter the league prevented him
from choosing his employer and negotiating his salary without a
cap. 95 Both the draft and salary cap were provisions on which
the entire NBA agreement was based.96 In contrast, Clarett, who
was ineligible for the NFL Draft, challenged a rule that served as
a complete bar to entry, not as a limitation on negotiating with a
specific employer or for a higher salary.97  This difference
illuminates two significant distinctions between the antitrust
challenges of Wood and Clarett. In Wood, both provisions were
mandatory subjects of bargaining, while the NFL eligibility rule
was not. The NBA's salary cap had a significant and direct effect
on the wages of all NBA players. In fact, it served as an absolute
limit on the amount of money each employer could pay its
91 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 956-57.
92 See id. at 959; see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134-36 (discussing the court's
application of the nonstatutory exemption in Wood).
93 Wood, 809 F.2d at 962 ("We also agree with the district court that all of
the... matters are mandatory subjects of bargaining .....
94 See id. at 961.
95 See id. at 958. Wood, who was drafted by the Philadelphia 76ers, sought an
injunction compelling the other NBA teams to cease their refusals to deal with him.
Id.
96 See id. at 957 (summarizing and discussing the relevant provisions of the
agreement).
97 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(stating that the eligibility rule "precludes players from entering the labor market
altogether"), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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employees. 98 Likewise, the draft process affects the players'
working conditions by ceding control over their place of
employment and their employer to the league and its teams. 99
Clarett was not challenging the NFL draft process, but rather
one of its rules determining which players are eligible to be
selected. 100 It is unlikely that anyone, whether an established
NFL veteran or an older potential draft selection, would see his
salary affected at all by expanding the pool of potential draft
picks, particularly given the NFL's insistence that younger
football players are "less mature physically and psychologically,"
and that their inclusion in the NFL would lead to "adverse
consequences."''1  Further, the challenged provisions in Wood
were the products of bona fide collective bargaining. The
agreement between the league and the union was reached in the
hours leading up to a union-imposed strike deadline, and the
salary cap and draft process were critical ingredients in a system
that also featured a salary floor and guaranteed revenue sharing
"unique in professional sports."'102 In stark contrast, the NFL's
eligibility rule predated collective bargaining in professional
football by more than forty years, and was not even contained
anywhere in the NFL's collective bargaining agreement. 10 3 These
key differences were overlooked by the Second Circuit and were
clearly significant enough to distinguish Clarett's complaint from
Wood's.
Eight years later in Caldwell, the Second Circuit again
applied the nonstatutory exemption to a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement dictating when an employer could
discharge an employee. 10 4 After Joe Caldwell played professional
basketball for five seasons, he was unable to find employment
and sued, alleging that he was being blacklisted in retaliation for
98 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 957.
99 See id.
100 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
101 Memorandum of the National Football League (1) in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) in Support of the NFL's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4, Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 03-CV-7441(SAS)).
102 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 957; see also infra notes 180-92 and accompanying
text (discussing the mandatory subjects of bargaining unique to professional sports
and their relationship to the eligibility rule at issue in Clarett).
103 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396; infra Part IV.C.
104 See generally Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
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his activity in the players' union.' °5 The court ruled for the ABA
and applied the exemption because "the circumstances under
which an employer may discharge or refuse to hire an employee"
are considered a mandatory subject of bargaining. 10 6
The Clarett court treated the Caldwell decision as almost
exactly on point, equating the teams' refusal to hire Caldwell
with the NFL's refusal to hire Clarett. 10 7 However, the Caldwell
court considered "refusal to hire" as being the same thing as
dismissal, thereby designating the National Labor Relations
Board as having proper jurisdiction over similar cases in order to
avoid "every employee who is discharged [from bringing] an
antitrust action similar to Caldwell's."' 08 The league's refusal to
hire a dismissed but formerly employed worker is very different
from the NFL's refusal to make Clarett eligible for its draft. The
rule in Caldwell was a mandatory subject of bargaining because
it was critical in determining the terms of how players were to be
employed, even though in this particular instance it served to
insulate Caldwell's dismissal from antitrust scrutiny.
0 9
However, the NFL's eligibility was not a mandatory bargaining
subject because it did not cover the wages, hours, and working
conditions of employees, but instead served to prevent some
prospective players from obtaining the possibility of
employment. 110
The last two cases cited as controlling in Clarett involved
whether the nonstatutory exemption covered provisions imposed
by professional sports leagues after collective bargaining
agreements expired."' In Williams, the NBA sought a
105 See id. at 525-26. At the time, the American Basketball Association was
involved in merger negotiations with the National Basketball Association, and
Caldwell asserted that he was prevented from playing in the ABA because, as a
former activist president of the ABA players' union, he might imperil the merger
negotiations. Id. at 526.
106 Id. at 529.
107 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
108 See Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 530. In addition, the court referred to "Caldwell's
claim regarding his discharge." Id.
109 See id. at 530-31.
110 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005); infra
Part IV.B.
111 See generally Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (determining
that the non-statutory labor exemption applied to the NFL's unilateral imposition of
a salary cap for developmental players after negotiations with the union had become
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declaratory judgment that its continued imposition of the draft
system, salary cap, and right of first refusal for free agents was
legal even though they were embodied in a collective bargaining
agreement that had expired. 112 The Second Circuit applied the
exemption because the players' claims threatened the legitimacy
of multi-employer bargaining-a longstanding and commonplace
means of bargaining-and conduct during negotiations for a
collective bargaining agreement is an issue better suited for the
National Labor Relations Board than the courts. 1 3
The following year, the Supreme Court decided a nearly
identical case in a nearly identical fashion, applying the
nonstatutory exemption to insulate the NFL's unilateral
imposition of a cap on the salaries of practice squad players after
its negotiations with those players had reached impasse."1 The
Court held that the nonstatutory exemption was not so narrow as
to protect only existing collective bargaining agreements and that
the exemption protected even post-impasse negotiations of an
expired agreement."15 Writing for the eight-justice majority,
Justice Breyer cautioned that the Court's decision was not a
complete carte blanche for employers to impose whatever terms
they wanted whenever they wanted to: "[o]ur holding is not
intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint imposition
of terms by employers, for an agreement among employers could
be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the
collective-bargaining process .... "116 Moreover, the Court
deadlocked); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that the NBA's conduct fell within the non-statutory exemption though the
challenged policies were unilaterally implemented by the league after negotiations
with the player's union on these subjects had reached impasse).
112 See Williams, 45 F.3d at 686. The right of first refusal enabled a team to
match any offer made to one of its restricted free agent players by another team. Id.
113 See id. at 693. The court also rejected the union's challenge to multi-
employer bargaining as a whole, calling it an important counterweight to the
potentially expansive powers of unions. Id. at 688-93.
114 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 234.
115 See id. at 243-47 ("One cannot mean the principle literally-that the
exemption applies only to understandings embodied in a collective-bargaining
agreement-for the collective-bargaining process may take place before the making
of any agreement or after an agreement has expired.").
116 Id. at 250. The lone dissenting justice was Justice Stevens, who argued that
"it would be most ironic to extend an exemption crafted to protect collective action by
employees to protect employers acting jointly to deny employees the opportunity to
negotiate their salaries individually in a competitive market." Id. at 255 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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seemed to reiterate the three factors from its Jewel Tea holding,
which were later adopted as the test in Mackey, by writing that
the provision "was directly related too the lawful operation of the
bargaining process. It involved a matter that the parties were
required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the
parties to the collective-bargaining relationship."
' 117
It is difficult to see how the decisions in Williams and Brown
are at all factually relevant to the argument presented by
Clarett. Both cases focused on antitrust challenges related not to
the "what" of collective bargaining, but rather to the "when." The
salary caps challenged in Williams and Brown were nearly
identical to the salary cap exempted from antitrust scrutiny in
Wood.118 The basis of the unions' challenges was that the
exemption expired at the same time as the collective bargaining
agreement. 119 In both cases, the courts disagreed and applied the
exemption to the collective bargaining process, rather than
merely the existing collective bargaining agreement.1 20 There is
nothing in either opinion that would suggest that this
chronological extension of the exemption post-expiration would
affect a determination of whether to apply the exemption to a
provision in an existing collective bargaining agreement, such as
the one between the NFL and the NFLPA.
The Second Circuit in Clarett held that "the path laid down
by these prior cases" led to the conclusion that "Clarett's
antitrust claims must fail."'121 Yet after examining the four cases,
it is clear that the court must have taken a detour along the way.
Wood and Caldwell both involved antitrust challenges to
provisions detailing the terms of how drafted players are
employed or discharged, both mandatory bargaining subjects and
both collectively bargained. 22 Williams and Brown differed only
117 Id. at 250.
118 Compare Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1987)
(defining the salary cap as a provision that established a maximum amount for
aggregate team salaries), with Brown, 518 U.S. at 235 (stating that the NFL
imposed a $1,000 per player weekly salary rate), and Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v.
Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (defining the salary cap system as
subjecting the total salary paid by each team to its players to a maximum).
119 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 235; Williams, 45 F.3d at 686.
120 See Brown, 518 U.S. at 235; Williams, 45 F.3d at 693.
121 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
122 See Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995); Wood, 809
F.2d 954.
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to the extent that they extended the exemption to the same terms
contained in expired agreements or made during negotiations. 123
None of these cases involved a rule limiting employee eligibility,
and none of the challenged provisions featured the tenuous
relationship to the collective bargaining relationship of the NFL
eligibility rule. Rather than guiding the court to apply the
nonstatutory exemption in Clarett, these four cases only
reinforced the rule that the exemption applies solely to
agreements over mandatory bargaining subjects that were
actually bargained.
11. MACKEY BY ANY OTHER NAME
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit, in Mackey v. National Football
League,124 declined to apply the nonstatutory exemption to the
"Rozelle Rule" for free agent compensation embodied in the
collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the
NFLPA.125 In reaching this conclusion, the Mackey court
established a three-factor test for determining the applicability of
the nonstatutory exemption, culling from Supreme Court
jurisprudence that the exemption should only be applied where
the restraint: (1) primarily affects parties to the collective
bargaining relationship; (2) covers a mandatory subject of
bargaining; and (3) is the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining.' 26  Each of these three factors is specifically
123 See Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Williams, 45 F.3d 684.
124 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
125 See id. at 623. The "Rozelle Rule" mandated that where one NFL team lost
the services of a player whose contract had expired, the player's new team had to
send the player's former team compensation, and that when the teams could not
agree on compensation, the Commissioner of the NFL could select the players or
draft choices that would serve as compensation. See id. at 609 n. 1.
126 Id. at 614.
We find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor policy favoring
collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-eminence over the
antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects only the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship .... Second, federal labor
policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought
to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.... Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is
furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where
the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-
length bargaining.
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mentioned in Justice White's decision in Jewel Tea.127 The
Mackey court held that the "Rozelle Rule" primarily affected
parties to the bargaining relationship, and was a mandatory
subject of bargaining, but that the rule was not the product of
bona fide arm's-length bargaining.
128
In the twenty-nine years since Mackey, it has been adopted
by both courts and commentators alike as the proper standard
for the nonstatutory exemption. 129 One notable exception has
been the Second Circuit, which, in Clarett, reiterated its refusal
to accept Mackey as identifying the "appropriate limits of the
non-statutory exemption."'130 The Clarett court criticized the
district court for its application of the Mackey test.13' However,
while the district court did rely on the three Mackey factors, it
acknowledged that the Second Circuit's standard was "the simple
formulation enunciated by the Supreme Court in [Jewel Tea] ."132
Although the Second Circuit has consistently refused to apply the
Eighth Circuit's test from Mackey, it has yetto adopt a test that
is at all distinguishable.
In 1981, the Second Circuit addressed the nonstatutory
exemption issue in Berman Enterprises v. Local 133, United
Marine Division.133 The court focused on Jewel Tea and decided
the nonstatutory exemption issue by looking at whether the
disputed collective bargaining provision affected nonparties and
whether it was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.134
Both factors are elements of the Mackey test, while the third
127 See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965); supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
128 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
129 See Cont'l Mar. of S.F., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817
F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-
98 (6th Cir. 1979); Thomas Lombardi, Can't We Play Too? The Legality of Excluding
Preperatory Players from the NBA, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 32, 38 (2002);
McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 6, at 391; Robert D. Koch, Comment, 4th and
Goal: Maurice Clarett Tackles the NFL Eligibility Rule, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
291, 297 (2004).
130 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005); see also Local 210, Laborers' Int'l Union v. Labor
Relations Div. Associated Gen. Contractors, 844 F.2d 69, 80 n.2 (2d Cir. 1988)
("Although we believe that the agreement... could satisfy [Mackey], we need not
adopt this particular analysis.").
131 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133.
132 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
133 644 F.2d 930, 935 (2d Cir. 1981).
134 See id.
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Mackey factor-bona fide bargaining-was addressed in the
court's recitation of the facts. 135 As a result, without mentioning
Mackey, and while adopting Jewel Tea as the proper standard for
applying the exemption, the Second Circuit essentially applied
Mackey.
In 1983, the Second Circuit again looked to Jewel Tea for the
appropriate contours of the nonstatutory exemption. In Home
Box Office, Inc. v. Directors Guild,136 the court expressly affirmed
the discussion of District Judge Sofaer, 137 who distinguished
Jewel Tea from Connell, Pennington, and Allen Bradley, by
looking to the three Mackey factors, without referring to Mackey:
Jewel Tea... is the only one of the four Supreme Court cases on
the non-statutory exemption that involves a collective
bargaining agreement whose terms concern only the bargaining
unit and that resulted from the arm's length ... bargaining ....
Moreover.... their purpose was strongly supported by federal
labor policy, because wages, hours, and working conditions...
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 138
The district court's holding, later affirmed by the Second Circuit,
is a virtual carbon copy of the Mackey test.139 It points to the
effect outside the bargaining relationship, the actual arm's-
length bargaining, and the subject of the bargaining. The two
tests are entirely indistinguishable.
The Clarett court further criticized Mackey as being
inapplicable to cases such as Clarett's where the plaintiff sues a
multi-employer bargaining unit over a restraint in the labor
market.1 40 However, the Second Circuit consistently used the
135 See id. at 932-33 (describing the parties' numerous attempts to negotiate a
new collective bargaining agreement).
136 708 F.2d 95, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The judgment below is affirmed for
substantially the reasons given by Judge Sofaer in holding that the actions and
agreements of the Guild are protected by the 'statutory' and 'non-statutory'
exemptions of labor union activities from the antitrust laws.").
137 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Director's Guild, 531 F. Supp. 578, 589-93(S.D.N.Y. 1982), affld, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Local 210, Laborers' Int'l
Union v. Labor Relations Div. Associated Gen. Contractors, 844 F.2d 69, 80 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1988) ("[W]e rely on the discussion of Jewel Tea and Connell Construction by
Judge Sofaer in Home Box Office .... ").
138 Home Box Office, 531 F. Supp. at 591-92.
139 Compare Home Box Office, 531 F. Supp. at 589-93 (discussing the same
three factors used in the Mackey test, though not attributing them to Mackey), with
Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (setting forth the
three factor test for the nonstatutory exemption).
140 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2004)
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Mackey factors to decide similar cases in professional basketball
disputes.141
In Wood, the Second Circuit held that the NBA's salary cap
provision was a mandatory subject of bargaining, 142 that it did
not affect employees outside the bargaining unit,143 and was the
product of bona fide collective bargaining.' 44 The court discussed
all three Mackey factors without expressly applying the Mackey
test. Similarly, in Caldwell, the court held that the discharge
provision in Caldwell's contract was a mandatory subject of
bargaining 145 and that it was actually bargained. 146 Since the
plaintiff was a suspended employee who was a union member,
47
it was clear that the discharge provision affected a party to the
bargaining relationship, and all three Mackey factors were
discussed and met, leading the court to apply the exemption.
Despite the Clarett court's claim that Mackey does not apply in
situations where the plaintiff sues regarding a restraint in the
labor market, the Second Circuit has repeatedly used the Mackey
factors (while rejecting Mackey in name) to apply the
nonstatutory exemption in exactly those cases.
The Clarett court's final reason for disregarding Mackey was
that it did not "comport with the Supreme Court's most recent
treatment of the non-statutory labor exemption"'148 in Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.' 49 Because Brown dealt with a dispute over
post-impasse implementation of terms rather than an existing
collective bargaining agreement, Brown's antitrust claim is
(distinguishing Clarett's labor market complaint from "cases in which employers use
agreements with their unions to disadvantage their competitors in the product or
business market"), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
141 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995); Wood
v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); see also supra Part II.
142 Wood, 809 F.2d at 962 ("We also agree with the district court that all of the
above matters are mandatory subjects of bargaining . .
143 See id. at 960-61.
144 See id. at 959 ("The draft and salary cap are not, however, the product solely
of an agreement among horizontal competitors but are embodied in a collective
agreement between an employer or employers and a labor organization reached
through procedures mandated by federal labor legislation.").
145 Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529.
146 See id. at 530.
147 See id. at 526.
148 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
149 518 U.S. 231 (1996); see also supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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distinguishable from Clarett's.15o Despite the factual differences,
the Supreme Court in Brown actually reaffirmed the three
factors of the Mackey test, holding that the NFL's conduct "took
place during and immediately after a collective-bargaining
negotiation. It grew out of, and was directly related to, the
lawful operation of the bargaining process. It involved a matter
that the parties were required to negotiate collectively. And it
concerned only the parties to the collective-bargaining
relationship."' 151 In this passage, the Court held that the NFL
met all three of the Mackey factors, and applied the nonstatutory
exemption. Rather than not comporting with the Brown decision,
the Mackey test appears to have been affirmed by it.
Despite explicitly rejecting the Mackey test, the Clarett court
actually applied all three of its factors in applying the
nonstatutory exemption to the NFL eligibility rule. The court
noted that the issue before it was whether subjecting the rule to
antitrust scrutiny would run counter to federal labor
principles.152 In deciding that it would, the court discussed the
Mackey factors, holding that the eligibility rule is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining because the NFL's system of
player salaries and rosters depends on it having a built-in
restraint on the market for incoming players. 153 Further, the
court stated that Clarett was not outside of the bargaining
relationship because the NFLPA represents the interests of
prospective employees in addition to actual employees. 54 Lastly,
the court held that, despite its omission from the text of the
collective bargaining agreement, the eligibility rules were the
product of actual bargaining because of the reference in the
agreement to the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. 155 As a result,
the court applied the nonstatutory exemption. 56 Although the
Clarett court specifically rejected the Mackey test in name, just a
few pages later, it applied all three of its factors in deciding to
150 See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
151 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
152 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138.
153 See id. at 139-40 (stating that "we find that the eligibility rules are
mandatory bargaining subjects"). The court speculated but declined to hold that all
eligibility rules are mandatory bargaining subjects. See id. at 139.
154 See id. at 140-41.
155 See id. at 142.
156 See id. at 125 n.1, 143 ("[W]e find that the eligibility rules are immune from
antitrust scrutiny under the non-statutory exemption .... ).
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apply the exemption.
While the Second Circuit has never officially adopted Mackey
as the proper test for applying the nonstatutory exemption, the
boundaries it has established are virtually indistinguishable, and
the three factors have been at the center of the relevant Second
Circuit decisions. Mackey's three prongs are all grounded in the
Supreme Court's early nonstatutory exemption jurisprudence,
and subsequent cases have only made it clearer that Mackey
provides the necessary framework for applying the nonstatutory
exemption.
IV. THE NFL FAILS THE MACKEY TEST
The Second Circuit applied Mackey in substance while
rejecting it in name. This Comment asserts that the Clarett
court erred in its application of the last two Mackey factors by
concluding that the eligibility rule was a mandatory bargaining
subject and that it was the subject of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining.
A. The Eligibility Rule Did Not Affect Parties Outside the
Bargaining Unit
The first prong of the Mackey analysis requires that, in order
to apply the exemption, the "restraint on trade primarily affect[ ]
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship." 157 The
Second Circuit was correct in concluding that the NFL's
eligibility rule primarily affects parties to that relationship.
Clarett argued that, as an amateur collegiate athlete who was
not a member of the NFLPA, he was an outsider to the NFL's
bargaining process. 158 The district court agreed with Clarett,
holding that his eligibility was not the NFLPA's "to trade
away."'159 The Second Circuit, however, held that Clarett was not
an outsider to the bargaining unit because the NFLPA has the
discretion and power to prioritize certain groups of employees,
157 Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
158 See Robert A. McCormick, Pro Teams Illegally Block Clarett from Football
Field, DETROIT NE-;S, Apr. 25, 2004, at 15A (indicating that Clarett, who is not an
NFL player or a union member, is a total stranger to the NFL collective bargaining
relationship).
159 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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which includes favoring veteran players over aspiring rookies. 160
It is clear that this was the correct view.
In Wood, the Second Circuit, in applying the nonstatutory
exemption to the NBA's salary cap and draft provisions, held that
collective bargaining agreements may be exempt from antitrust
scrutiny although they may adversely affect prospective
employees. 161 In fact, if this were not true, the entire collective
bargaining process would collapse, since "[e]mployers would have
no assurance that they could enter into any collective agreement
without exposing themselves to" antitrust liability. 162
Similarly, in Zimmerman v. National Football League,163 the
district court applied the exemption to protect a unique
supplemental draft bargained between the NFL and NFLPA. 164
Applying Mackey, the court held that potential future players are
parties to the collective bargaining relationship because the
agreement binds all employees who subsequently enter the
bargaining unit.165
Although Clarett was not a member of or directly
represented by the NFLPA at the time the collective bargaining
agreement was executed, these prior cases have demonstrated a
judicial decision to include prospective employees as indirectly
represented members of the bargaining unit.166 This relationship
is reflected in the NFL's collective bargaining agreement, in
which the NFLPA is recognized as the bargaining representative
of all present and future NFL players, including all rookies,
drafted and undrafted, upon commencement of their employment
negotiations with NFL teams. 167 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
was correct in concluding that the NFL eligibility rule did not
primarily affect outsiders to the bargaining unit.
160 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
161 See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that the statutory definition of "employee" was crafted to include workers outside of
the bargaining unit).
162 Id. at 961.
163 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
164 The supplemental draft was designed to allow teams to draft players playing
in a rival professional football league, the USFL, without risking a selection in the
annual April draft. See id. at 401.
165 See id. at 405 ("Not only present but potential future players for a
professional sports league are parties to the bargaining relationship.").
166 See Koch, supra note 129, at 305.
167 CBA, supra note 18, pmbl.
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B. The Eligibility Rule Was Not a Mandatory Subject of
Collective Bargaining
The second prong of the Mackey test ensures that only
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining receive the benefits
of the nonstatutory exemption. 168 Federal labor law provides a
statutory definition for mandatory bargaining subjects, requiring
employers and the employees' representatives to collectively
bargain "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."'169 As the Supreme Court gave shape
to the nonstatutory exemption, one of the key controversies was
whether to issue a blanket exemption for all provisions
concerning mandatory subjects. 170 This dispute played out in
Jewel Tea, where Justice Goldberg's concurrence advocated a
total exemption for mandatory subjects, but the Court's opinion
required analysis of additional factors.' 7' While not all
agreements concerning mandatory subjects are necessarily
exempt, the requirement that any agreement seeking the
exemption concern a mandatory subject has been at the heart of
the Supreme Court's decisions. 172 The issue, as it was in Jewel
Tea, was whether the eligibility rule is intimately related to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
The Second Circuit held that the eligibility rule was a
mandatory subject of bargaining for two reasons. First, it
strongly suggested that all eligibility rules for professional sports
leagues would be mandatory bargaining subjects. 73 Second, the
court held that as a result of the unique economic imperatives of
professional sports, such as capped salaries, fixed rosters, and
free agency, the eligibility rule has "tangible effects" on the
168 Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding
that "federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining").
169 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000).
170 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (referencing the difference in
opinion, between Justices White and Goldberg, with respect to blanket exemptions
for mandatory bargaining subjects).
171 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
172 See supra Part I.
173 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Though
tailored to the unique circumstance of a professional sports league, the eligibility
rules for the draft represent a quite literal condition for initial employment and for
that reason alone might constitute a mandatory bargaining subject."), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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wages and working conditions of NFL players.' 74 This Comment
asserts that the Second Circuit was incorrect in holding that the
eligibility rule was a mandatory bargaining subject on either
ground.
The Clarett court strongly suggested that all player
eligibility rules may be mandatory bargaining subjects because
they serve as total bars to employment. 175 In reaching this
conclusion, the Second Circuit cited its decision in Caldwell v.
American Basketball Ass'n, 76  in which it applied the
nonstatutory exemption to the termination provisions in players'
contracts, as binding authority. 177 However, while Caldwell held
that the instances under which an employer may refuse to hire
an employee constitute a mandatory bargaining subject, it only
discussed the refusal to hire an employee already discharged-a
veteran basketball player unable to sign with any other team. s78
The decision of each team to refuse to hire an existing employee
is completely distinguishable from a league-wide mandate to
refuse eligibility. The Caldwell decision was therefore clearly not
binding on Clarett.
The Second Circuit then concluded that because the
competitive imperatives of professional sports require a highly
regulated economic structure, the NFL's eligibility rule had a
sufficient effect on wages and working conditions to qualify it as
a mandatory bargaining subject. 179 In the professional sports
context, courts have determined that salary caps, 80
compensation systems for free agents,' 8 ' and player selection
drafts 8 2 are all mandatory subjects of bargaining because of
their fairly clear effects on employee wages and working
conditions. Salary caps serve as an obvious limitation on
employee wages. The reserve clause regulates player movement
for veteran players, while the draft process serves the same
174 See id. at 140.
175 See id. at 141 ("[C]larett is ... no different from the typical worker who is
confident that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not possess the
qualifications or meet the requisite criteria that have been set.").
176 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
177 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139-40.
178 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
179 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139-40.
180 See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 691 (2d Cir. 1995).
181 McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v.
Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
182 Williams, 45 F.3d at 691.
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function for incoming players, ensuring that entering rookies will
not have the ability to auction their services to the highest
bidder.18 3 The connection between player eligibility and wages
and working conditions is not nearly as clear-cut. 18 4
The Clarett court held that rookie eligibility, along with team
salary caps, team rookie salary caps, and salary minimums, was
part of the scheme by which individual player salaries are
established. 8 5 It is difficult to see how the eligibility rule fits
into this complex puzzle. While it is true that the NFL's capped
salary structure guarantees that every player's salary has some
impact on the salaries of his teammates, 8 6 expanding the pool of
eligible rookies would do little to affect any player's salary, except
to ensure that the previously ineligible player is earning one.
The eligibility rule does not serve as a limitation on the number
of players in the NFL, since the roster limitations in the CBA
regulate roster size. 8 7 Instead, the eligibility rule limits the
number of prospective players competing for spots on team
rosters and money under the NFL's rookie salary cap. 88 It is
clear that teams would not pay Clarett and his ineligible peers
higher salaries. In fact, chief among the NFL's justifications for
the eligibility rule was the insufficient psychological and
emotional maturity of younger players to play professional
football, as well as their "peculiar susceptibility to injury."'1 9 If
these players are ill-equipped to handle the rigors of their
employment and are at a high risk of injury, it is highly unlikely
that they would be paid disproportionately higher salaries. It is
equally unlikely that younger players would make salaries
disproportionately low enough to jeopardize the job status of
183 See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1987).
184 See Koch, supra note 129, at 306 (stating that "the league age restriction has
nothing to do with the working hours or wages in the NFL").
185 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
156 See id.
187 See CBA, supra note 18, art. XXXIII.
188 See id. art. XVII.
189 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005). Not everyone
in professional football agrees with this contention. Indianapolis Colt Edgerrin
James, a running back like Clarett, felt Clarett could thrive in the NFL at 19 years
old. See Interview by Michael Silver with Edgerrin James, in My Take, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 20, 2004, at 37.
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established veterans as feared by the Second Circuit. 190 A team
could not devote a significant number of roster spots to these
younger players, pay them reduced salaries, and comply with the
league's rookie salary cap, since each player would still have to
be paid the league's individual salary minimum. 191
Every NFL team must simultaneously abide by both the
rookie salary cap and the team salary cap. Accordingly, there is
competition between rookies and veterans for roster spots and
playing time. 192 However, expanding the number of eligible
rookies would not substantially increase the competition between
rookies and veterans because the fixed rookie salary cap would
guarantee that teams could not afford to pay an increased
number of rookies on their rosters while still paying them the
league-wide minimum salary. Instead, expanding the number of
eligible rookies would spark greater competition among rookies
for roster spots and pieces of the rookie salary pie. Since the
amount of money teams pay their rookies is fixed, and teams
cannot pay them unusually low salaries and would not pay them
unusually high salaries, expanding the rookie pool would not
result in any greater threat to veteran job security, and would
have little impact on wages and working conditions in the NFL.
Nor would abolishing the eligibility requirement have the
dramatic effect on the length of NFL careers as the Second
Circuit feared.193 A player entering the NFL immediately after
graduating high school would gain, at most, three additional
seasons. The NFL has concluded that younger players are at a
much higher risk of injury,1 94 which makes younger players'
careers unlikely to be lengthened, since playing at a younger age
is counterweighted by the accompanying heightened injury risk.
Similarly, because the risk of injury is so high for these younger
players, and their maturity so low, it is hard to believe that very
many will be drafted or signed. Players like Clarett will still be
the rare exception. Accordingly, because so few younger players
will be drafted or signed, their effect on the NFL labor market
190 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140 ("Because the size of NFL teams is capped, the
eligibility rules diminish a veteran player's risk of being replaced by [a rookie].").
191 CBA, supra note 18, art. XXXVIII.
192 See, e.g., Viv Bernstein, Manning Does His Part to Start a Controversy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at D1 (detailing New York Giants quarterback competition
between veteran Kurt Warner and rookie Eli Manning).
193 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140.
194 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
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will be minimal at best.
The Second Circuit's conclusion that the eligibility rule was
an integral part of the NFL's salary structure is not reflected in
the collective bargaining agreement. The court cited the
eligibility rule as operating in concert with the draft, the team
and rookie salary caps, and free agency to regulate the economics
of professional football.195 Those other provisions were all
described in significant detail in the collective bargaining
agreement. 196 The eligibility rule is not included anywhere in the
text of the agreement. In addition, the commissioner is vested
with the authority to declare as eligible a player three seasons
removed from his graduation. 197 If regulating the market for
incoming players were so critical to the economic foundation of
the NFL, and if expanding that market to include younger
players had such detrimental consequences, the bargaining
parties would certainly have included it in the collective
bargaining agreement, avoiding any grant of discretionary power
to the commissioner.
Because the eligibility rule does not affect wages, hours, or
working conditions in the NFL, it is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining and accordingly cannot be shielded from antitrust
scrutiny under the nonstatutory exemption.
C. The Rule Was Not the Product of Bona Fide Arm's-Length
Bargaining
The third and final factor in the Mackey test requires that
the restraint be the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining. 198 Since the nonstatutory exemption is based on
judicial recognition of the need to insulate the products of
collective bargaining from antitrust liability, courts have
required a showing that the restraint was actually bargained
over.199 The district court held that the eligibility rule was not
the product of negotiations. 200 In reaching this conclusion, the
195 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140 ("The eligibility rules in other words cannot be
viewed in isolation, because their elimination might well alter certain assumptions
underlying the collective bargaining agreement ... ").
196 See CBA, supra note 18, arts. XVI (NFL Draft), XVII (Rookie Salary Cap),
XIX-XX (Free Agency), XXIV-XXV (Salary Cap).
197 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 127.
198 See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
199 See McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 6, at 411.
200 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
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court noted that the eligibility rule predated the inception of
collective bargaining in the NFL by forty years, and the only
evidence that the eligibility rule was addressed during the
negotiations was the declaration of an NFL lawyer. 20 1 Further,
the eligibility rule was not contained within the text of the
collective bargaining agreement itself. Instead, it was merged
into the agreement through an NFLPA waiver of any right to
bargain over the provisions contained in the NFL Constitution
and Bylaws.202 The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the
NFLPA could have chosen to bargain over the eligibility rule, but
decided not to, and that the bona fide bargaining requirement
does not require a showing of a quid pro quo. 20 3 However, giving
so little weight to the actual bargaining that produced the
eligibility rule conflicted with significant prior precedent and is
inconsistent with the very purpose of the nonstatutory
exemption-that only restraints of trade that were actually
bargained should be afforded protection from antitrust liability.
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit did not exempt the NFL's
Rozelle Rule because it was not the product of bona fide arm's-
length negotiations. 204 The court gave the collective bargaining
negotiations a careful review, concluded that the Rozelle Rule
was not the subject of any bargaining, and looked further at the
relatively weak bargaining position of the NFLPA compared to
that of the NFL.205 The court focused on the "little discussion
concerning the Rozelle Rule."20 6 In Mackey, as in Clarett, the rule
in dispute was formed before the advent of collective bargaining
in the NFL.20 7 The Mackey court treated this as significant in
holding that the rule was not the product of negotiations, 208
whereas the Clarett court did not.
In contrast to the token negotiations in Mackey, the
extensive bargaining over a similar reserve clause in professional
hockey led the Sixth Circuit to apply the exemption in McCourt v.
rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
201 See id.
202 See id.; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
203 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124,142-43 (2d Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
204 See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1976).
205 See id.
206 Id. at 612.
207 See id. at 616.
208 See id.
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California Sports, Inc. 209 The court pointed to the concessions
made by the league in exchange for the players' acceptance of the
restraint, as well as to the negotiating pressure applied by the
players, which included threats of lawsuits and work
stoppages.210 Similarly, in Zimmerman v. National Football
League,211 the court applied the exemption to a supplemental
draft that was bargained in a quid pro quo fostered by the NFL
and the NFLPA. The court contrasted the detailed negotiations
over the draft with the minimal bargaining over the Rozelle Rule
in Mackey, and compared them to the lengthy negotiations in
McCourt in deciding to apply the exemption.
212
The negotiations over the eligibility rule were far more
similar to those in Mackey than those in McCourt or Zimmerman.
Like in Mackey, the eligibility rule predated collective bargaining
in the NFL and was unilaterally imposed at the beginning of the
bargaining relationship, rather than actually bargained for.
21 3
Similarly, there was virtually no evidence that the eligibility rule
was ever placed on the bargaining table.214 The eligibility rule is
found nowhere in the nearly 300-page, 61-article Collective
Bargaining Agreement, which contains a lengthy article on the
provisions and rules for the annual draft.21 5  In fact, the
incorporation of the rule into the Collective Bargaining
Agreement is through a waiver of the right to bargain over the
NFL Constitution and Bylaws. 216 In reaching its conclusion, the
Clarett court concluded that the waiver by both parties of their
right to bargain over the eligibility rule was, in itself, the product
of collective bargaining. 217
The Second Circuit excused the rule's absence from the
209 600 F.2d 1193, 1201-03 (6th Cir. 1979).
210 See id. at 1202.
211 632 F. Supp. 398, 406-08 (D.D.C. 1986).
212 See id. at 406.
213 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
214 Id.
215 See Koch, supra note 129, at 308; see generally CBA, supra note 18.
216 CBA, supra note 18, art. III, § 1.
217 See Mark Maske & Leonard Shapiro, Draft Rule Will Be Made Much Clearer,
WASH. POST, May 27, 2004, at D3 (stating that although"[the Second Circuit] agreed
with the NFL's assertion that its draft-eligibility rule should be exempt from
antitrust scrutiny because it resulted from collective bargaining," the NFLPA
acknowledged that the rule will be included within the next collective bargaining
agreement to avoid challenges like Clarett's ).
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agreement by pointing to the Supreme Court's holding in Brown
that the nonstatutory exemption applies to provisions outside of
collective bargaining agreements. 218 This conclusion is based on
a significant misreading of Brown. The Brown ruling exempted
the NFL's post-impasse imposition of terms, and extended the
exemption to this unilateral imposition of terms because this
tactic is an integral part of the collective bargaining process. 219
The Brown holding extended the exemption from the mere words
of an existing collective bargaining agreement to the parties'
tactics and strategies when that agreement expires. 220  The
NFL's eligibility rule is entirely distinguishable. It was not a
term imposed during negotiations, but rather a rule which pre-
dated the negotiations, and was jammed into the collective
bargaining agreement through a merger clause. This was hardly
the intent of the Supreme Court when it expanded the scope of
the nonstatutory exemption beyond the words of existing
collective bargaining agreements.
Applying the three factors of the Mackey test to the NFL's
eligibility rule reveals that the Second Circuit erred in applying
the nonstatutory exemption. Although the rule primarily
affected only the bargaining unit, it neither concerned a
mandatory subject of bargaining, nor was the product of bona
fide arm's-length negotiations. Because the NFL's eligibility rule
could not meet all three prongs of Mackey, it should not have
been exempted from antitrust liability review.
CONCLUSION
The nonstatutory exemption is a necessary evil, stemming
from judicial recognition that in order to accomplish the goals of
federal labor laws, some activity that would otherwise violate
antitrust laws must be tolerated. However, the Supreme Court
did not create a blanket antitrust exemption for every provision
in every collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the Court
crafted an exemption that would only insulate certain restraints
that addressed mandatory subjects, that affected only those in
218 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 137 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
219 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 243 (1996).
220 See Jonathan C. Tyras, Note, Players Versus Owners: Collective Bargaining
and Antitrust After Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 297, 331-
32 (1998).
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the bargaining relationship, and that were actually the fruits of
collective bargaining negotiations. This Comment has suggested
that in Clarett v. National Football League, the Second Circuit
extended the nonstatutory exemption beyond its original scope-
protecting the NFL's eligibility rule that neither covered a
mandatory bargaining subject nor stemmed from actual collective
bargaining. The Clarett decision set a dangerous precedent,
tipping the scales of the delicate balance between federal labor
law and antitrust law too far in favor of labor law.
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